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Starting from the System Justification Theory, the aim of this paper is to explore levels of general system 
legitimation, inequality perception and meritocracy perception among Croatian citizens, as well as to de-
termine whether there is a difference between social groups of lower and higher social standing in this 
regard. Survey research on a sample of the Croatian general population (N = 353) revealed that on balance 
the respondents do not perceive the Croatian social system as legitimate, equal and meritocratic. Regres-
sion analyses showed that retired persons express a substantially higher level of system legitimation and 
meritocracy perception when compared to employed persons, while higher religiosity was also a significant 
predictor in this regard. When it comes to the inequality perception, only female gender was a significant 
predictor. The results are discussed within the framework of the contemporary theories of meritocracy and 
system legitimation, as well as with reference to specific social and economic characteristics of the Croa-
tian society, such as the Croatian War of Independence, transition to capitalism, welfare state development 
and labour market situation. Overall, the study results provide only a partial confirmation of the System 
Justification Theory.
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1. Introduction – two waves of discontent in 
the Croatian society
The last decade of the twentieth century in Europe 
was marked by the decline of socialism and new op-
portunities for the countries behind “the iron cur-
tain“. The Croatian society at the time found itself 
in very specific circumstances. Already in the first 
years of transition, many companies were collaps-
ing and unemployment was rising. The state was 
consequently expected to have effective social jus-
tice and social sensitivity mechanisms. The stratifi-
cation of society into the narrow strata of the rich 
and the majority population of the poor had acti-
vated many vulnerable social groups in seeking the 
right to a decent life. According to Haramija and 
Njavro (2016), dissatisfaction with the transition 
was the result of unsatisfactory circumstances re-
sulting from five factors: poor economic structures 
inherited from socialism, the institutional legacy of 
socialism, hasty privatization, the failed policies of 
the market shock therapy, and finally, the underde-
veloped nature of investments that went mainly to 
the financial sector. It is no wonder, therefore, that 
the results of a research project in the late 1990s 
showed widespread dissatisfaction with the social 
consequences, efficiency and fairness of privatiza-
tion (Peračković, 1999).
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In a nutshell, Croatian society has been living in a 
state of permanent dissatisfaction since the inde-
pendence, which was rooted in dissatisfaction with 
the reforms in the socialist society. The first wave 
of dissatisfaction - dissatisfaction with the transi-
tion and its effects - can be dated from the mid-
1990s until the start of the Great Recession, whose 
intensity in Croatia began to be felt in 2008, when 
the second major wave of discontent began. From 
the onset of the crisis to the present, the discon-
tent with political governance and the inefficient 
public sector has begun to dominate, and to slowly 
counteract the dissatisfaction with the social effects 
of capitalism. Croatia, either intentionally or unin-
tentionally, has chosen the middle road between 
liberal market economies (such as those of the Bal-
tic countries) and coordinated market economies 
(such as Slovenia). However, such choices have led 
to double unfavourable outcomes - lagging behind 
in economic growth while increasing poverty risks 
comparable to those of the countries that have cho-
sen more consistent and thus socially insensitive 
market reforms (Lučev, Babić, 2012).
The developmental problems of the Croatian so-
ciety in these two waves of dissatisfaction can be 
linked to the social deficiencies highlighted by 
Franičević (2002), which arise from specific social 
ties that have had a pronounced impact on eco-
nomic processes. Thus, in the period of political 
capitalism as Županov called it (1995), it is noted 
that the influence of kinship, political, ethnic and 
regional ties impeded economic and social devel-
opment. In the context of clear and effective social 
norms, such relationships can act as a generator of 
social capital and promote trust leading to lower 
transaction costs. But in the opposite situation, the 
impact is less positive. On the other hand, strong 
social ties in the Croatian context were manifested 
through pronounced national-political identifica-
tion, which can also have double effects. On the one 
hand, such identification can increase the level of 
generalized trust and consensus around a socioeco-
nomic development strategy. On the other hand, 
the strong identification and image of the cohesive 
community can block the changes and necessary 
sacrifices that any reform effort must require. The 
growing discourse on the need for reform and the 
“weakening” of the state may be precisely the re-
sult of the weakening national identification. From 
a socio-anthropological perspective, it could be 
claimed that in the Croatian society the processes 
described by Dinko Tomašić in the 1930s have con-
tinued to exist. Tomašić writes that cities were con-
quered by villages whose population significantly 
influenced the change in the social structure of cit-
ies. Something similar happened to the Croatian 
society in the early years of independence. A large 
population (mostly rural) came to Croatian cities, 
and from such heterogeneous population the new 
management elite was recruited. Kinship, regional 
and political ties became a common criterion for 
social advancement. The rapid enrichment of in-
dividuals, accompanied by an increasing number 
of the unemployed, had become a frequent media 
topic. As Šundalić (2010: 54) pointed out, “cities, as 
administrative-political centres, had become hubs 
of the homo novus with unnatural mix of socially 
responsible functions and socially insensitive be-
haviour, ..., The accelerated social stratification gen-
erated social discontent and existential insecurity, 
which was also confirmed by the growing distrust 
of institutions. The experience of the past years of 
transition has caused scepticism among the citi-
zens when it comes to the state and prospects for 
the economy, democracy, civic values,  and the like“.
2. Theoretical framework and research 
questions
It could be expected that the aforementioned social 
circumstances reflect differently on various social 
groups. It would also be very intuitive to posit that 
beliefs of social groups correspond to their real 
social circumstances and interests. For example, 
in a study from the late 1990s, Magdalenić (1998) 
found that the perception of social justice fulfil-
ment in Croatia was lower for those workers who 
were less satisfied with their current circumstances 
and estimated their standard of living being lower 
than before the war. However, the system justi-
fication theory (SJT; Jost, Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 
2013; Jost et al., 2004) holds that people oscillate 
between ego-justification, group-justification and 
system-justification. In other words, in some cases 
people will espouse beliefs that promote their real 
material interests or the feeling of self-worth. In 
other cases, group justification will be more pro-
nounced. As proposed by the social identification 
theory (e.g., Tajfel, 1978, 1981), people tend to have 
negative out-groups beliefs and positive in-group 
beliefs in order to maintain the sense of self-worth 
or to promote group interests. However, SJT pro-
ponents argue that there are epistemological rea-
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sons, primarily related to reducing of anxiety and 
uncertainty, which lead individuals to justify the 
existing social system. In some cases, especially 
when there are strong ideological legitimizing be-
lief systems, social beliefs will mirror and legitimate 
the real positions of the social group. Sometimes, 
especially when measured with implicit measures, 
low status social classes (or groups in general) will 
hold negative in-group beliefs and tend to hold the 
system as just and legitimate, mainly because of the 
cognitive dissonance process. It is natural to think 
that persons in disadvantaged social position would 
hold negative beliefs about the contemporary Croa-
tian society, but the aforementioned mechanism of 
cognitive dissonance might counteract such beliefs. 
Additionally, according to SJT, such justification 
beliefs are more often to be found when lower class-
es have no strong group interests in a particular 
case (Owuamalam et al., 2017), which is surely the 
case when holding beliefs about the contemporary 
Croatian society and its characteristics. In sum, as 
Brandt (2013) noted, SJT can be distinguished from 
the competing theories, such as the aforementioned 
social identity theory and social dominance theory 
(Sidanius, Prato, 1999), precisely by the assertion 
that lower status persons provide more legitimacy 
to the system due to cognitive dissonance (the so-
called status-legitimacy hypothesis).
Empirical confirmation of SJT is relatively scarce, 
and almost exclusively found with regard to dif-
ferences between ethnic and racial groups (Henry, 
Saul, 2006; Sengupta et al., 2015). On the other 
hand, Brandt (2013) tested the system justification 
theory in three multi-year studies with large and 
representative samples and found no confirmation 
for the status-legitimacy hypothesis. Using various 
measures of low status (class, education, gender, 
race) and different measures of legitimacy (mainly 
trust and confidence in the system and social in-
stitutions), he also found no support for the con-
tention that the status-legitimacy takes place only 
in specific circumstances such as high inequality 
and high opportunities for social protest. In other 
words, even such social circumstances did not pro-
duce cognitive dissonance that would lead to the 
status-legitimacy. Chang and Kang (2018) analysed 
the data from the World Values Survey (WVS) 
2005-2007 and found that as a person’s income lev-
el rises, the preference for redistribution becomes 
weaker, albeit with moderating impact of national 
identification. These results were fully confirmed 
by Caricati (2016) using the data from the Inter-
national Social Survey Program (ISSP). He found 
that lower status individuals, measured by social 
class, income, and self-position in social hierarchy, 
were more likely to perceive the income differences 
as too large. This relation is even stronger in more 
democratic countries, which is contrary to the pre-
dictions of the SJT.
Therefore, contrary to SJT, it seems that the re-
search evidence is in line with the real-conflict the-
sis which posits that persons in lower social posi-
tions, in accordance with in-group interests, tend 
to show lower levels of willingness to legitimize the 
social system in which they live, as well as the fact 
that they are more critical about inequalities and 
lack of meritocracy. This position is often labelled 
as the “realistic group conflict theory“. Having this 
in mind, the aim of this paper is to explore levels of 
general system legitimation, inequality perception 
and meritocracy perception among Croatian citi-
zens, and to determine whether there is a difference 
between social groups of lower and higher social 
standings in this regard. With this in mind, in the 
research three research questions were proposed:
RQ1. Do Croatian citizens perceive the social 
system as legitimate, equal and meritocratic? 
RQ2. Are the aforementioned constructs simi-
lar of distinct?
RQ3. Are there any differences between social 
groups with higher and lower social standing 




The inequality perception was measured by a 
scale consisting of two items whereby respond-
ents should indicate their level of agreement on a 
five-point Likert type response format. Similar, al-
beit one-item measures of inequality, were used in 
Larsen (2016) and Roex, Huijits and Sieben (2019). 
The results on the items were summed in order to 
obtain the summary measure of inequality percep-
tion (Cronbach’s α = 0.72).
The items were as follows:
Croatian society is polarized – there is a gap be-
tween the rich and the poor
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Croatian society is insensitive towards the less for-
tunate – some social groups are struggling (unem-
ployed, retired persons, disabled persons, etc.).
The perception of meritocracy was measured by 
means of an item/statement, whereby respondents 
also indicated their level of agreement on a five-
point Likert type response format. The statement 
was as follows:
Croatian society is meritocratic – people get ahead 
by hard work, knowledge and ability.
Economic and political legitimacy perception was 
measured by a four-item scale consisting of two 
items which measured the level of economic devel-
opment and two statements which measured the 
level of political development of Croatian society. 
Here as well the respondents were asked to indicate 
their level of agreement with statements on a five-
point Likert type response format. The statements 
were as follows:
Croatian society is economically developed
Croatian society is economically rich
Croatian society is fully democratic
In Croatian society there is a high level of awareness 
about citizens’ political rights
The results on the items were also summed in order 
to obtain a summary measure of general system le-
gitimisation (Cronbach’s α = 0.66).
Gender was measured with participants’ self-re-
ported gender (coded 0 = women and 1 = men). 
Level of education was measured on a five-point 
scale ranging from 1 (elementary school or less) to 
5 (graduate or postgraduate degree). Place of resi-
dence was measured as a binary variable, with rural 
= 0; urban = 1. Religiosity was measured on a five-
point scale (1 – not religious at all, 5 – fully reli-
gious). Veteran status was measured by asking the 
respondents whether they or at least one of their 
parents had participated in the Croatian War of In-
dependence (Yes = 1; No = 0).
3.2 Sampling
In the study, a non-random sample of the Croatian 
population was used (N = 353). Namely, under-
graduate students from the Faculty of Economics, 
Josip Juraj Strossmayer University of Osijek (Croa-
tia), collected the data by F2F interviewing in their 
place of residence by means of a snowball sampling 
procedure. Having that in mind, it can be assumed 
that most of the respondents are residents of Slavo-
nia and Baranja region. The data were collected in 
January 2019.
In the sample, there were 54.0% of female and 46.0% 
of male respondents.1 The average age was 39.66 
years (SD = 17.20). About 65.63 % of the respond-
ents live in urban areas and the remaining 34.38 % 
in rural settlements. When it comes to employment 
status, the data are as follows: employed – 46.02%, 
unemployed – 15.34%, retired – 13.92%, and stu-
dents – 24.72%. Regarding the war veteran status, 
48.58% of the respondents personally participated 
in the Croatian War of Independence or at least 
one of their parents was a participant. The average 
religiosity on 1 to 5 scale amounted to 3.46. Only 
5.97% of the respondents were people with elemen-
tary school or less. Almost a half of the respondents 
(45.17%) completed a four–year secondary school, 
while a three-year secondary school was completed 
by 7.67% of the respondents. The share of respond-
ents with undergraduate degree was 26.99%, while 
the remaining 14.20% had graduate or postgraduate 
degree.
4. Results
Our analysis plan included descriptive statistics 
(RQ1), correlational analyses (RQ2), and hier-
archical multiple regression analyses (RQ3). As 
noted in measurements section, we measured 
economic and political legitimacy perception with 
four items and summed up the results in order to 
obtain a total score of legitimacy. Such a score had 
a minimum of 4 and a maximum of 20. The aver-
age result was 11.45 (SD = 2.86). The least accept-
ed statement was the one concerning the aware-
ness about citizens’ political rights (M = 2.43, SD 
= 1.01), followed by the statement about economic 
development (M = 2.63, SD = 0.92), the statement 
about the economic richness of Croatian society 
(M = 2.91, SD = 1.08), and the level of democracy 
in Croatian society (M = 3.49, SD = 1.06). When it 
comes to inequality perception, the average result 
on the two-item scale (the minimum was 2 and 
maximum 10) was 7.84 (SD = 1.60). Both state-
ments had similar levels of agreement – the po-
larisation statement with the average of 3.99 (SD = 
0.88) and the insensitivity statement with 3.85 (SD 
= 0.94). The average meritocracy perception on a 
1 to 5 scale was 2.43 (SD = 0.98). The intercorrela-
tions (Pearson’s r) were as follows:
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Table 1 Intercorrelation matrix
Items Economic and political legitimacy Meritocracy Inequality
Economic and political legitimacy 1 0.37 - 0.20
Meritocracy 0.37 1 - 0.20
Inequality - 0.20 - 0.20 1
Source: Authors
As the first criterion in the regression analyses the 
system legitimation was entered. Before the analy-
sis, we checked that all the requirements of the mul-
tiple linear regression were satisfied. Namely, there 
was no autocorrelation (Durbin-Watson statistics 
was 1.52), residuals were approximately normally 
distributed with no apparent heteroscedasticity, 
and there were no multicollinearity issues (all the 
variance inflation factors were between 1 and 2).
From Table 2, we can note that only religiosity and 
employment status (retired vs. employed persons) 
proved to be significant predictors. More precisely, 
a one point rise in religiosity leads to the 0.58 rise 
in the political and economic legitimation scale (β 
= 0.24) when all other predictors are held constant. 
Retired persons had 1.18 points higher result on the 
scale. It could be also noted that education is close 
to the significance level of .05 (p = 0.09).
Table 2 Hierarchical linear regression with system legitimation as a criterion variable
Model 1 Model 2
Variable b SE B β b SE B β
Gender 0.02 0.31 0.01 0.18 0.32 0.03
Age (in years) -0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.04
Residence 0.44 0.32 0.07 0.36 0.33 0.07
Religiosity 0.59 0.13 0.25** 0.58 0.13 0.24**
Empl. status – unemployed -0.05 0.45 -0.01
Empl. status – retired 1.18 0.56 0.14*
Empl. status – student 0.03 0.46 0,01
War veteran 0.30 0.32 0.05
Education -0.29 0.17 -0,10
R2 0,06 0,08
Adjusted R2 0,05 0,06
R2 - change 0,06 0,02
F for change in R2 5.54** 1.58
Gender: Female = 0, Male = 1; Employment status: employed as the reference category; War veteran status: Yes = 1; No 
= 0; Residence: Rural = 0; Urban = 1. 
*p < .05, **p < .01 
Source: Authors
In the second analysis, meritocracy perception was 
entered as the criterion variable. In this case as well 
all the requirements of the multiple regression were 
satisfied. Durbin Watson statistics was 1.52, the 
residuals were normally distributed, there was no 
heteroscedasticity judging from the residuals distri-
butions, and there were no multicollinearity suspi-
cions (VIFs ranged from 0 to 1).
The data show that religiosity and employment sta-
tus (retired persons and students when compared to 
employed persons) led to higher meritocracy per-
ception. Religiosity was not as strong a predictor as 
in the case of economic and political legitimisation 
(b = 0.10, β = 0.12). Retired persons had 0.53 points 
higher meritocracy perception than employed per-
sons, while students’ results was 0.37 points higher.
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Table 3 Hierarchical linear regression with meritocracy perception as a criterion variable
Model 1 Model 2
Variable b SE B β b SE B β
Gender 0.12 0.11 0.06 0.14 0.11 0.07
Age (in years) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03
Residence 0.10 0.11 0.05 0.10 0.11 0.05
Religiosity 0.11 0.05 0.13* 0.10 0.05 0.12*
Empl. status – unemployed 0.16 0.16 0.06
Empl. status – retired 0.53 0.20 0.19**
Empl. status – student 0.37 0.16 0.17*
War veteran 0.12 0.11 0.06
Education 0.05 0.06 0.05
R2 0.02 0.07
Adjusted R2 0,01 0.05
R2 – change 0.02 0.05
F for change in R2 2.14* 3.34**
Gender: Female = 0, Male = 1; Employment status: employed as the reference category; War veteran status: Yes = 1; No 
= 2; Residence: Rural = 1; Urban = 2. 
*p < .05, **p < .01 
Source: Authors
In the end, we also conducted a hierarchical linear re-
gression with the perception of inequality as the crite-
rion variable. In this case, only gender happened to be 
a significant predictor. Namely, women had 0.42 points 
higher results than men (β = 0.13), i.e. they more often 
see Croatian society as polarised and insensitive.
Table 4 Hierarchical linear regression with inequality perception as a criterion variable
Model 1 Model 2
Variable B SE B β B SE B β
Gender 0.47 0.18 0.15** 0.42 0.19 0.13**
Age (in years) 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.06
Residence -0.20 0.18 -0.06 -0.21 0.19 -0.06
Religiosity -0.03 0.08 -0.02 -0.02 0.08 -0.02
Empl. status – unemployed -0.01 0.26 -0.01
Empl. status – retired -0.21 0.33 -0.05
Empl. status – student -0.33 0.27 -0.09
War veteran -0.27 0.18 -0.08
Education 0.02 0.10 0.01
R2 0.04 0.05
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.03
R2 – change 0.04 0.01
F for change in R2 3.20* 1.03
Gender: Female = 0, Male = 1; Employment status: employed as the reference category; War veteran status: Yes = 1; No 
= 2; Residence: Rural = 1; Urban = 2. 
*p < .05, **p < .01 
Source: Authors
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5. Discussion
From the descriptive results it can be concluded 
that the respondents do not perceive the social sys-
tem as legitimate, equal and meritocratic, thus giv-
ing the answer to the RQ1 posed in this study. First, 
the respondents judge the current level of econom-
ic inequality in Croatian society as unacceptable, as 
the average result on a 2 to 10 scale was 7.84. This 
does not come as a surprise, having in mind that the 
citizens of former socialist East-European countries 
are very critical towards inequality in their societies 
(e.g., Kelley, Zagorski, 2004) and hold a non-meri-
tocratic perception of their societies (e.g., Redmond 
et al., 2002). It is interesting to note that the income 
inequality rose in Croatia in comparison to the so-
cialist times, but not at levels that are observable in 
some other transition countries. Namely, the Gini 
coefficient rose dramatically in the Slavic republics 
of the former Soviet Union, as well as in the Baltics. 
For instance, the Gini for Lithuania rose from 23 in 
the period 1987-1988 to 37 in the period 1993-1995 
(Milanović, 1998: 42-43). As Nestić (2003) showed, 
in Croatia the rise was almost negligible, from 0.286 
in 1988 to 0.297 in 1998. Nestić attributed this to 
the slow economic development that was not con-
ducive to significant wage differentials and property 
earnings, as well as to early retirement schemes and 
other indirect social and capital transfers. The first 
point is very interesting since the perception of so-
cial differentiation was very widespread because 
of the property redistribution and the crony capi-
talism at the time. However, the share of property 
income was probably still very low in the entire 
income distribution (Nestić, 2003: 15). In the last 
ten years, Gini has even shown a slightly decreasing 
trend, from 31.6 in 2010 to 29.7 in 2018.2
From the results it can also be inferred that the 
respondents judge Croatian society to be slightly 
non-meritocratic since the average results on a 1 
to 5 scale was 2.43. Meritocracy is usually defined 
as a system where social positions are awarded by 
a transparent and impartial system that rewards 
merit  –  a combination of capabilities and effort 
– rather than social class origin or other ascriptive 
characteristics (for different approaches to defin-
ing meritocracy, see Kim, Choi, 2017). Coupled 
with a just distribution of wealth, this can be seen 
as a necessary constituent of a just society. How-
ever, all contemporary societies represent a mix 
of meritocratic (education, ability, effort, etc.) and 
non-meritocratic (corruption, family wealth, politi-
cal influences, random life circumstances, etc.) ele-
ments. It is no wonder that a large number of recent 
studies show that citizens often do not see societies 
in which they live as meritocratic. Reynolds and 
Xian (2014) found that Americans more often hold 
meritocratic than non-meritocratic beliefs. How-
ever, almost a quarter of them simultaneously hold 
both meritocratic and non-meritocratic beliefs. In 
Bubak’s (2019) study based on the WVS data, even 
in the Confucianism-permeated Chinese culture 
the statement that personal success is determined 
by forces outside of one’s control (luck determines 
success) had the average of 3.7 on a 1 to 10 scale. 
A similar mix of meritocratic and non-meritocratic 
perceptions was also found in a study conducted on 
a sample of Croatian student population (Šundalić, 
Pavić, 2011). Non-meritocratic elements are more 
often to be found in times where old institutional 
arrangements are abandoned, i.e. when individual 
aspirations are boundless and not integrated into 
legitimate social goals. In classical sociological the-
ories, this situation is often labelled as anomy (Dur-
kheim, 1997). In other words, the transition from 
one system to another always carries the uncertain-
ty of the unknown. At first, the “misinterpretations” 
of the new system are happening. They can be in-
tentional and sometimes due to the circumstances 
in which the transition occurs. The transition of 
Croatian society began in the circumstances of the 
Croatian War of Independence that destabilized life 
throughout Croatia. In addition, the experience of 
the legacy of socialist economic policy and social-
ist culture of collectivism and egalitarianism repre-
sented an unfavourable climate for the takeover of 
civic culture and market economy.
The level of system legitimisation is also quite low 
– the average of 11.45 on a 4 to 20 point scale. This 
finding is not a surprise, given the developmental 
and political problems described in the introduc-
tion, as well as the results of previous research that 
indicated very low and declining trust in the main 
institutions of Croatian society (Baloban, Rimac, 
1999; Sekulić, Šporer, 2010). As an illustration, ac-
cording to the public opinion research of Ivo Pilar 
Institute of Social Sciences (the so-called Pilar’s 
barometer of Croatian society) conducted in 2016, 
only 3 of the 11 listed institutions were rated with 
an average higher than 5.0 on a 1 to 10 point scale. 
As can be noted in the intercorrelational matrix, the 
three constructs are interrelated, especially when it 
comes to economic and political legitimisation and 
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perception of meritocracy. In consequence, our an-
swer to the RQ3 would be that Croatian citizens see 
lack of meritocracy as one of the important reasons 
for the current problems related to political and 
economic development.
In order to provide an answer to the RQ2, we con-
ducted three regression analyses, which revealed 
some differences between social groups with regard 
to the outcome variables. The most striking find-
ing is that retired persons perceived the system as 
more legitimate and meritocratic as compared to 
the employed persons. As a possible explanation, 
we can note that Croatia fits nicely into the group of 
societies with high elderly-biased welfare spending 
focus. Welfare systems in those societies, of which 
Southern European countries such as Italy, Greece 
and Spain are good examples, are focused on main-
taining social services for the elderly (mainly gen-
erous retirement schemes) as opposed to provision 
of services for younger cohorts such as child care 
or youth-targeted employment programs (Henjak, 
2008). Even though pension allowances in Croatia 
are not high, early retirement schemes and special 
pensions provisions (war veterans, etc.) probably 
create some complacency among older generations 
and divert resources from possible social programs 
for the youth. This further translates into high lev-
els of youth unemployment and dependence on 
families for housing provision and income. For in-
stance, in 2018, youth unemployment rate in Croa-
tia amounted to 23.8%, putting Croatia in the fourth 
place in the EU.3 In addition, the estimated average 
age of leaving the parental home was over 31 years, 
the second highest in the EU.4 Greater satisfaction 
of retired persons can also be interpreted through 
relative deprivation (Runciman, 1966; Townsend, 
1979), according to which pensioners no longer 
have such a critical attitude to the existing social 
situation since they have resolved their life priori-
ties. However, an important theoretical note should 
be made. Specifically, there is a growing body of 
evidence showing that citizens are also oriented to-
wards supranational criteria in assessing their sta-
tus (Watson et al., 2010; Berthoud, 2012). In other 
words, in this case, the unfavourable assessment of 
Croatia might have drawn down the satisfaction, 
hiding the possible differences that arise from the 
different position within the Croatian society. Thus, 
relative deprivation is a term that operates at dif-
ferent levels of analysis, whereas groups with which 
individuals and groups are compared are manifold 
and variable, with different comparison criteria 
being included in different contexts (Fahey, 2010). 
In the context of our research, given the accession 
to the European Union and the increasing promi-
nence of European issues in Croatian society, it can 
be assumed that all categories of citizens compare 
Croatia to other, primarily developed, European 
countries. For example, an analysis conducted by 
Berthoud (2012) shows that one third of percep-
tions of poverty can be explained by income relative 
to the country average and two-thirds by income 
relative to average income in the European Union. 
This implies that the overall assessment of the situa-
tion may affect different estimates of intra-national 
deprivation. 
Also unexpected is the finding that there is no 
greater dissatisfaction among unemployed persons 
when compared to employed persons. Namely, the 
polarisation in the perception of inequality could be 
affected by the general level of meritocratic percep-
tions in a country. La Roex et al. (2019) found that 
a country level of meritocratic perceptions is con-
nected to higher polarisation between lower and 
higher socioeconomic strata with regard to income 
inequality. Having in mind low meritocratic per-
ceptions in the current study, therefore, we would 
expect that employment status and education sig-
nificantly impacted the perception of inequality 
in Croatian society. However, it can be assumed 
that in the situation of intensive emigration a large 
number of individuals who were unemployed and 
dissatisfied with this fact either left the country 
or found employment. Furthermore, it is possible 
that employee dissatisfaction also prevails with the 
existing situation, that is, the mere fact of employ-
ment does not significantly reduce it due to insuf-
ficient salaries and inadequate working conditions.
Older age in previous research was often con-
nected to less meritocratic perceptions (Barnes, 
2002; Reynolds, Xian, 2014). The usual explanation 
is the so-called exposure thesis, which posits that 
experiences of unfair treatment and other non-
meritocratic experiences accumulate over time and 
produce cynicism about meritocracy. However, the 
age effect was not found in the current study. The 
probable explanation is that the age-effect in this 
case was not linear, but curvilinear. Namely, the 
aforementioned higher perception of economic 
and political legitimacy and meritocracy among 
retired persons has surely affected the relationship 
between age and these outcome measures.
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The lack of differences in attitudes with relation 
to the war veteran status can be explained in two 
ways. One relates to the proportion of measure-
ment error that we agreed to when designing the 
question in such a way that it included not only 
veterans but also veterans in the family. Such a 
decision was conditional on a relatively small 
planned sample, but it led to the stated measure-
ment error resulting from differences in attitudes 
between the veterans themselves and their family 
members, since in some cases these views would 
not coincide. The second interpretation may re-
fer to the very ambivalence of attitudes that may 
stem from veterans’ experience and from warfare 
in general. On the one hand, suffering can lead to 
greater dissatisfaction regarding the social situa-
tion. But on the other hand, the same experience 
can lead to the activation of cognitive dissonance, 
which entails a selective perception that focuses 
more on the more positive aspects of the achieved 
state, especially on the attainment of state inde-
pendence. Thus, for example, in a study of the per-
ception of privatization Peračković (2000) found 
that war victims had a somewhat more positive 
perception of the privatization process than other 
citizens.
With regard to gender, the direction of the possible 
theoretical hypothesis is not clear. On the one hand, 
exclusion from the labour market could lead to “ac-
quired helplessness“ and the attitudes that social 
positions are gained through forces beyond one’s 
control, which was confirmed in a research based 
on the WVS data (Fisman, O’Neill, 2009), but also 
disconfirmed in a study based on the USA General 
Social Survey data (Reynolds, Xian, 2014) wherein 
the correlation ran in the opposite direction. On the 
other hand, in the Croatian socioeconomic context, 
precisely the same factor can lead to unfavourable 
experiences and resentment due to unemployment, 
low pay, substandard working conditions, etc. In 
other words, increased participation in the labour 
market could lead to the perception of a lack of 
meritocracy and disappointment with the current 
social and economic development.
With regard to religiosity and meritocratic beliefs, 
our results confirm research indicating that reli-
gious persons tend to espouse individualistic be-
liefs about individual success (Hunt, 2002) and that 
atheists hold meritocratic perceptions about their 
society less often than religious persons (Reynolds, 
Xian, 2014). In other words, religiosity might foster 
the feeling of personal responsibility that translates 
into higher levels of legitimacy and meritocracy 
perceptions. In the Croatian society there is also 
an additional contextual factor related to the right-
wing political orientation and religiosity. Namely, 
in Croatia, higher religiosity is connected to the 
right-wing political values and attitudes (e.g., La-
bus, 2005; Sekulić, Šporer, 2006), with affirmative 
views about the Croatian statehood and negative 
views about the Yugoslav state being an important 
part of such attitudes. Consequently, holding af-
firmative views about the Croatian statehood and 
negative views about contemporary Croatian soci-
ety at the same time would represent a dissonant 
state of mind, thus leading to higher legitimacy and 
meritocracy perceptions.
6. Conclusion
As expected, the results of our pilot study showed 
a low level of meritocratic beliefs and political and 
economic legitimisation, as well as high intolerance 
to the current level of inequalities in Croatian so-
ciety. When it comes to group differences in per-
ception, we did not find consistent support for the 
social justification theory, the only exemption being 
more legitimacy and meritocratic perceptions of 
the retired persons. However, we believe that such, 
somewhat surprising, finding might be explained 
by evoking the peculiarities of the Croatian labour 
market, such as early retirement and war pensions. 
Given the multitude of possible measures of the 
aforementioned constructs, future studies with 
different measures should check the robustness of 
our findings when it comes to Croatian society. In 
addition, since our study was conducted on a non-
random sample, future studies with random sam-
ples are warranted.
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Kapitalizam, meritokracija i legitimacija:  
hrvatsko društvo trideset godina poslije
Sažetak
Polazeći od teorije opravdanja sustava, cilj je ovog rada istražiti razinu opće legitimacije sustava, percepciju 
nejednakosti i percepciju meritokracije među hrvatskim građanima, kao i utvrditi postoji li razlika između 
socijalnih skupina nižeg i višeg društvenog položaja u ovome smislu. Anketno istraživanje na uzorku opće 
populacije Hrvatske (N = 353) pokazalo je da ispitanici hrvatski društveni sustav ne smatraju legitimnim, 
jednakim i meritokratskim. Regresijske analize pokazale su da umirovljenici iskazuju znatno viši stupanj le-
gitimacije sustava i veću percepciju meritokracije u usporedbi sa zaposlenima, a veća je religioznost također 
značajan prediktor u tom pogledu. Kad je u pitanju percepcija nejednakosti, samo je ženski spol bio znača-
jan prediktor. Rezultati se u radu stavljaju u okvir suvremenih teorija meritokracije i legitimacije sustava, 
a objašnjavaju se i specifičnim socijalnim i ekonomskim karakteristikama hrvatskog društva, kao što su 
Domovinski rat, tranzicija u kapitalizam, razvoj socijalne države i stanje na tržištu rada. Ukupno gledajući, 
rezultati studije pružaju samo djelomičnu potvrdu teorije opravdanja sustava.
Ključne riječi: meritokracija, legitimacija, društvene nejednakosti, kapitalizam, Hrvatska, teorija opravda-
vanja sustava
